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Abstract Performance measurement of Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) is of
increasing importance for aid agencies, policy-makers and donors. A widely used
benchmark for measuring the efficiency of NPOs is the overhead cost ratio, consist-
ing of the total money spent on administration and fundraising relative to the budget.
Donors generally favor a lower overhead cost ratio as it ensures that more money
directly reaches beneficiaries. Unlike fundraising expenses, administrative costs do
not contribute to advertising the actions of an NPO even though they account for a
significant proportion of overhead cost. Reducing administrative expenses is a logical
consequence from a financial viewpoint, but might negatively affect NPOs through the
resulting administrative capacities. This phenomenon is known as “Nonprofit Starva-
tion Cycle”. This work provides an analytical framework for analyzing NPO decision
making concerning administrative costs. The paper provides answers to important
research questions on the optimal level of administrative spending, the influencing
factors and the effects of available information on NPOs. The research shows that
focusing on financial performance measurements can result in reduced utility cre-
ated for NPOs. Less transparency often leads to increased utility for NPOs, but more
transparency can increase NPOs’ utility if the information available exceeds a certain
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threshold. Fluctuating donations are challenging for NPOs’ planning and may impact
administrative capacities negatively.
Keywords Funds allocation · Performance measures · Analytic model · Utility
function
1 Introduction
Private donors face an ever growing number of organizations asking for their support
and have to decide on whom to donate to (Kovács and Spens 2007). Donors cannot
readily obtain information about whether organizations use their funds in the way the
donors intend or do so in the most efficient way. Benchmarks are a tool for assessing
the performance of an NPO, well suited to support the decision making process of the
donor. An easily accessible and widely used benchmark is the ratio overhead costs
relative to total expenses, since these numbers can be extracted from publicly available
accounting information. Overhead costs consist of administrative and fundraising costs
(Bowman 2006), they comprise all expenses that are not related to programs, and there-
fore, do not directly create impact. These costs include costs for staff at headquarters,
office supplies, marketing and rent. However, no standardized definition of administra-
tive costs exists. Often, administrative costs are labeled as part of indirect costs, which
are used in a supportive way to facilitate the use of the direct costs, accounting for
project expenses. The United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund Secretariat
(2012) describes administrative costs as costs for “[...] recruitment and servicing of
staff, consultants and fellowships, procurement and contracting (usually centralized),
budget preparation and control, financial operations, accounts, reporting, and audit-
ing”. As Ortiz (2001) shows in a study conducted for, among others, USAID, there is
no single standardized way to attribute costs to their respective categories, but three
groups of costs have been defined: General management costs for all activities, research
and development costs and support services, including costs for premises, IT, finance
costs and administrative, personnel and training costs. Inconsistencies in definition
have been criticized by the United States Government Accountability Office (2010).
At the same time that donors decide on whom to donate to, NPOs have to balance the
allocation of funds in order to achieve goals and sustain the future inflow of donations,
enabling the creation of future impact. On the one hand, donations cannot be diverted
from the organizations’ intended usage according to the non-distribution constraint
(Hansmann 1987), which states that while NPOs are allowed to make profits, they
are not allowed to distribute net earnings but have to use them for the organizations’
purposes. On the other hand, donations can be even bound to a certain type of usage,
like the response to a specific disaster, which has become known as “earmarking” in
the literature (Toyasaki and Wakolbinger 2014 or Bhattacharya et al. 2014).
Therefore, NPOs face a basic decision of using the received, non-earmarked, dona-
tions either for the programs they conduct, for increased fundraising activities, or for
increased administrative capacities. The direct link between such financial decisions
in general, operations of an NPO and its efficiency has been described by Wakol-
binger and Toyasaki (2011) for the case of funding systems. While increased program
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expenses can increase the impact created by NPOs’ operations and attract even more
donations, the effect of increased fundraising expenses is ambiguous. Okten and Weis-
brod (2000) describe two countervailing effects connected to increases in fundraising
expenses: On the one hand, fundraising has a cost effect, reducing the efficiency of
NPO operations through additional, not impact creating, expenses, but on the other
hand, the advertisement effect attracts higher donations. Lastly, following this line of
arguments, administrative costs, which consist of costs that cannot be clearly attributed
to specific programs or fundraising, provide only a cost effect without advertisement,
thus no positive effect on the sum of donations.
From this viewpoint, the development of the “Nonprofit Starvation Cycle” (Lecy
and Searing 2015) can be considered as a foreseeable development: Triggered by
donor expectation concerning ‘acceptable’ overhead ratios and NPO rating organi-
zations publishing benchmarks based on overhead ratios, donors reward low ratios
by donating more to seemingly ‘efficient’ NPOs. This lures NPOs into decreasing
the ratio of overhead to gain a competitive advantage in donation ‘markets’, fur-
ther elevating donor pressure by increasingly unrealistic expectations. At some point,
overhead costs can only be decreased by choosing between reducing necessary admin-
istrative capacities or engaging in misreporting on overhead used as a misleading
tactic to succeed in this price war turned into a race to the bottom (Lecy and Searing
2015).
While many authors have described this development under different names [“Non-
profit starvation cycle” (Wing and Hager 2004), “Evaluability bias” (Caviola et al.
2014) or “New bottom-line movement” (Frumkin and Kim 2001)]. Some even
suggest engaging in this creative accounting by using large donations from major
philanthropists to cover overhead costs and advertising to other potential donors
that their donations will go in full towards the programs to avoid this “overhead
aversion” (Gneezy et al. 2014). This behavior is supported by findings that the
quality of the reported ratios has limited impact on donations (Yetman and Yetman
2013).
The reliance on overhead cost ratios as quality indicators of NPO operations has
been unanimously identified as detrimental to the NPO sector. Studies find no cor-
relation between low overhead expenses and high efficiency of NPOs (Caviola et al.
2014). Infrastructure investments are a necessity for making good use of resources
(Bhattacharya et al. 2014). Lack of marginal data concerning costs render overhead
ratios useless as decision support indicators (Tinkelman 2006).
This article will focus on the role of administrative costs as part of overhead costs.
Although the majority of overhead costs consist of administrative expenses (Lecy and
Searing 2015), much work about the impact of fundraising expenses on the behavior
of NPOs was conducted. Relatively little research has been conducted on the impact
of administrative costs in NPO operations, as mentioned by Tinkelman and Mankaney
(2007) and Aldashev and Verdier (2010). Based on a compound utility function for
NPOs, the optimal level of administrative cost ratios is investigated through the devel-
opment of an analytical model of NPO actions. Hence, the following questions will
be investigated in this paper:
– What is the ‘optimal’ level of the administrative cost ratio for an NPO?
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– How do changing donation levels, fundraising expenses, efficiency gains from
administrative spending and donor reaction to overhead information affect optimal
administrative expenses?
– Is the recent trend for more information about overhead costs provided to donors
beneficial for NPOs?
Our research shows that the focus on financial performance measurements in NPOs
and resulting reduced administration cost ratios can reduce the utility created for NPOs.
Less transparency can lead to increased utility for NPOs. Fluctuating donations pose
a challenge to NPOs’ planning and can result in negative impact on administrative
capacities.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 presents models and
a brief description of the relevant parameters, followed by Sect. 3 introducing the
numerical studies conducted. This includes optimality and sensitivity analysis and an
extension of the model, which contains the degree of transparency concerning financial
information. Section 4 concludes the paper, proposing future research opportunities
and pointing out managerial insights.
2 Model
The model proposed for the analysis of the effects and impact of administrative cost
ratios takes the financial decision-making of one single NPO into account. Generally
speaking, the budget acquisition process of an NPO follows a common pattern, which
can be seen in Fig. 1.
First, donations are solicited with support of fundraising. The received donation
sum d∗1 depends on the base donation amount d1 for this specific time period and the
NPO’s previous overhead cost performance, potentially increasing or decreasing this
base donation amount. This ‘price effect’ will be described later in more detail. The
base donations describe the donation potential that could be solicited by the NPO in
question, including all factors that are not directly related to administrative expenses
like recurrent donations made by an established donor base, the reputation of the NPO,
the appeal of current programs, donor willingness to donate, the advertisement effect of
fundraising expenses attracting new donors and many more. After receipt of donations,
fundraising expenses f1 have to be covered. Then the remaining funds are allocated to
their different forms of usage, either for administration or directly for the programs.
Fig. 1 Sequence of events
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This paper enters this process at this decision-making stage of funds allocation.
The NPO decides upon the level of administrative costs relative to total budget
and maximizes the utility created. The effects of the decision are twofold, influenc-
ing the utility in two consecutive periods (accounting years): firstly they determine
the effect on the impact generated by the NPO for the beneficiaries in the present
period through improving the efficiency of the NPO if administrative spending cor-
responds to the operational needs for administrative support and through changes
in the program ratio. This is the ratio of funds available spent directly on the
programs, which is reduced if administrative expenses are increased. Both effects
influence the realized impact in the current period. Secondly the future budget is
negatively influenced by the level of the overhead cost ratio. While the fundrais-
ing expenses and their resulting advertisement effect increasing future donations
are not investigated in this paper in detail,1 the negative impact of donor aware-
ness about higher overhead ratios on future donations (price effect) is considered in
detail.
The decision on the design of the objective function is of central importance for
the proposed model. A frequently employed approach is using the available budget
as a measure for utility, which is to be maximized. This budget maximizing approach
does not consider all aspects of the environment an NPO acts in. Martinez et al. (2011)
and Aldashev and Verdier (2010) use the utility of different groups with potentially
diverging objectives, including groups like beneficiaries and donors. It can be expected
that NPOs take these stakeholders into account when planning their actions, especially
donors are sometimes regarded as the ‘real’ customers in a humanitarian relief situ-
ation, which is due to the dependence on and competition for funding (Balcik et al.
2010).
In this section, we introduce an NPO utility function, which is a two-stage
compound utility function. Following Steinberg (1986), the utility of an NPO
is associated herein with the success in financially sustaining their operations
through maximizing current and future impact. Additionally, the objective of the
beneficiaries is taken into account via maximizing the current impact of the
NPOs’ programs, which is assumed to be identical to the goal of the donors, as
suggested by Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986). This section describes first the
required parameters and variables, then the utility function is described in more
detail.
2.1 Decision variable and parameters
The proposed model is based on the analysis of one single decision variable, α1,
the ratio of the total budget used for administrative purposes and employs a variety
of parameters. As the utility function is a compound utility function over 2 periods,
describing current impact (first period) and future impact (second period) maximizing
goals, some parameters can be associated specifically with one period while others are
1 The impact of the advertisement effect can be approximately explored in our model by changing the
parameter f1 and d∗1 simultaneously. However, this analysis is out of scope of our research.
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Table 1 Notation and assumptions
Decision variable
α1 Administrative cost ratio
Parameters current period t1
a Utility function weight parameter
α0 Administrative expense ratio in previous period
d∗1 Realized donations current period
d∗0 Realized donations previous period
d1 Base donations current period
f0 Fundraising expenses in previous period
f1 Fundraising expenses current period
w1 Price effect of overhead of previous period
x1 Efficiency gain parameter
Parameters future period t2
α2 Administrative expense ratio in future period
b Discount factor
d2 Base donations future period
d∗2 Realized donations future period
f2 Fundraising expenses in future period
g2 Future period efficiency gain effect
i2 Information parameter
p2 Future program ratio
w2 Price effect of overhead
x2 Future efficiency gain parameter
Auxiliary variables
d∗1 d1 · (1 − (α0 + f0d0 ) · w1)
g2 1 + α2 · x2
p2 1 − α2 − f2d2
Assumptions
1 > a > 0 Positive weight values
1 ≥ b ≥ 0 Depreciation factor limits
d∗0,1,2 > 0 and d0,1,2 > 0 Non-negativity of donations
1 ≥ i2 ≥ 0 Information level limits
f0,1,2 ≥ 0 Non-negativity of fundraising expenses
w1,2 > 0 Price effect limits
x1,2 > 0 Positive efficiency gain parameter
(p2, g2) ≥ 0 Non-negativity of unmodeled effects
used throughout the function. An overview of the employed parameters and auxiliary
variables (including parameters for model extensions) and their limits can be found in
Table 1.
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2.2 A basic model
As can be seen in Model 1a, the utility function consists of two components, current
impact and future impact maximizing parts that are weighted by a and 1 − a respec-
tively. To limit the influence of the parts to positive values, the weight parameter is
limited to 1 > a > 0. While, for calculations in this paper a value of a = 0.5 is
assumed to depict an NPO indifferent between the two components, a higher value of
a would represent a stronger focus on current impact generation while a smaller value
of a would represent stronger focus on sustaining future operations. These two parts
will be described in detail in the following sections.
Model 1a: Compound utility function
Both periods contain the effects on the impact created resulting from
– the price effect (i.e. the effect of available overhead cost information on the dona-
tion behavior)
– the program ratio (i.e. the residual budget spent on programs after deducting over-
head costs)
– the efficiency gain (i.e. the increase in impact resulting from the more efficient use
of program expenses due to increased administrative capacities)
To make this long formulation a little easier to grasp, all effects leaping over from
previous periods or leaping over to future periods which do not directly depend on our
decision variable α1 are abbreviated by auxiliary variables. These auxiliary variables
contain only parameters and can therefore be treated as single parameters as well.
We continue by describing the different effects of the current and future period in
the abbreviated Model 1b which is used in the remainder of the paper and end this
description with an explanation of the auxiliary variables.
2.2.1 Period 1: current impact
In the current period, the donations that have been collected, d∗1 , are used as a budget
to create impact. The first period accounts for the current impact maximizing part of
the utility function. For the calculations, a donation sum of $550,000 is assumed, as
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this is part of the range of NPO size where overhead expense ratios play an important
role, as Lecy and Searing (2015) show. This period combines the program ratio, the
ratio of donations available for programs, with the efficiency gain effect of increased
administrative expense ratios.
Program ratio
Out of this available budget d∗1 , the ratio that can be used for projects, and thus impact,
is the residual ratio after subtracting the ratio for administrative tasks and the expenses
for fundraising, therefore the multiplication with 1 −α1 − f1d∗1 is required. If either the
ratio used for administration or for fundraising are increased, the money effectively
spent on programs is reduced accordingly. For the calculations contained in this paper,
a value of three percent for f1d∗1 is considered following the recent contribution of Lecy
and Searing (2015), resulting in f1=16,500$.
Efficiency gain
Since the impact achieved by the program budget depends not only on the amount
of money spent on programs, but also on the efficiency of the administration of the
programs, the efficiency gains realized by the administrative expenses are accounted
for by including the term 1 + α1 · x1. Hence, x1 is a parameter describing the lin-
ear efficiency gains depending on the level of administrative cost relative to budget,
α1. Any increase in x1 increases the positive effect of administrative expenses on the
fulfillment of the NPO goals through the programs, increasing the impact created at
stable program expenses. For calculations, a value of x1 = 2 is assumed. The notion
that decreased administrative spending reduces the capacity of the NPO is brought for-
ward by many authors discussing the Non-Profit Starvation Cycle, most notably Lecy
and Searing (2015) and Wing and Hager (2004). Our model assumes that efficiency
gains are often not cumulative, i.e. previous administrative expenses do not guarantee
higher efficiency in the current period. Administrative expenses for staff salaries, rent
or office supplies constitute a substantial proportion of administrative expenses, but
have no effect on the efficiency of future periods. On the other hand, if more long-term
investments are made, their costs are attributed often to the period in which they are
used. Examples for this are expenses for software licenses for a new accounting sys-
tem, which would be due in each period, or depreciable costs of real estate resulting
from investments into office buildings. Therefore, efficiency gains have no multiperiod
effects but depend on the administrative expenses of each separate period.
2.2.2 Period 2: future impact
This period includes the impact of the future budget situation on the impact realized
and, thus, the decision-making process of the NPO. The discounted future dona-
tions depend on the (unmodeled) advertisement effect of fundraising expenses and
the impact of the level of overhead expenses (price effect) on the donations of the
next period. Additionally, the program ratio and efficiency gain are included through
auxiliary variables g2 (efficiency gain in the future) and p2 (program ratio effect of
the future period).
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For developing a future impact-related utility measure, a well developed approach is
followed, describing the interaction of administrative cost ratios and donation level.
Therefore, in analogy to the “price of giving” (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986) we
use a metric for the influence of overhead cost increasing this cost [(as used for exam-
ple in Bowman (2006)], and fundraising or admin cost (Greenlee and Brown 1999)
in more detailed studies and frequently applied since then, for example Khanna and
Sandler (2000). This follows the idea of a ‘market’ for donations, where more ’expen-
sive’ NPOs receive fewer donations due to their smaller fraction of donations spent
on programs.
The terms used for the future, or second, period in the utility function describe the
aim of the NPO to maximize its future impact. A donor can judge the NPO according
to the data available on overhead cost. Assuming that there is a maximal donation sum
that can be solicited, this would be reduced relative to the ratios of overhead α1 + f1d∗1 ,
but corrected for the cost effect on donations w2 and, since the resulting donations
will not be available in this period, a discount factor b.
Discount factor
As the future budget does not become available in the current, or first, period, monetary
values have to be discounted according to the preference of the NPO. As b describes the
discount factor, a low value would indicate little utility gained from future donations,
while a higher value would emphasize the benefits of future donations, sustaining
operations in the periods to come. A high preference for future donations could be
especially prevalent in a period, in which a lot of funding is available for a very
prominent cause, like in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake. In such a situation,
it is important to sustain financial flows even after the time of peak donations resulting
from peak media attention, as the response to such disasters continues much longer than
media attention. For the calculations included in this paper, the average global inflation
rate in consumer prices of currently 4.7% is used, as provided by the International
Monetary Fund in its World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund 2017).
A realistic setting of one year periods results therefore in b = 1
(1+0.047) . Therefore, b
is assumed to be 0.9551.
Price effect
The next multiplicative term influencing future donations includes fundraising and
administrative expenses as part of a ‘price effect’ inspired by the “price of giving” of
Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986), including administrative ratio α1 and fundraising
expense ratio f1d∗1 increasing the price of giving for the donors, expressed by p =
1
1−(α1+ f1d∗1 )
. This is multiplied by the effect w2 of this overhead cost ratio on the
donation sum, constituting the price effect. Borrowing again from the literature, Peloza
and Steel (2005) found for more than 50 regression analyses an average value of −1.44
for donation elasticity of overhead cost.
For the calculations provided in this paper, the value of w2 is calculated using a
donation function with constant price elasticity of demand of −1.44. The donation
function D consists of the price of giving p multiplied with an price effect parameter
w2, hence D = p · w2. Given the empirical data from Peloza and Steel (2005), a
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donation function with constant elasticity can be formulated like D = p−1.44. This
donation function can be rearranged to resemble the format of D = p ·w2 through the
expansion of D = p · p−1.44−1, with p−1.44−1 behaving like w2. Now, the average
values for the reasonable range of the overhead ratio of 0.03 ≤ (α1 + f1d∗1 ) ≤ 0.5, or,
in terms of price of giving p, 1.03093 ≤ p ≤ 2, of w2 are calculated. This leads to a
value of w2 = 0.37204, which will be used in the following calculations.
2.2.3 Auxiliary variables
In order to arrive at total impact created in both current and future period, the effects
leaping over from previous periods and leaping into future periods have to be taken
into account as well. In the current period, the price effect of the previous period is
acknowledged by including it implicitly in the realized donation sum d∗1 . This budget
d∗1 is an auxiliary variable for d1 · (1 − (α0 + f0d∗0 ) · w1), describing the changes to the
base donations d1 through donors considering previous overhead ratios.
The future impact relies also on effects which are included through auxiliary vari-
ables, p2 for the effect of future program ratio and g2 for the efficiency gain effect.
The future program ratio can be formulated as p2 = 1 − α2 − f2d∗2 , depending on
future administrative cost ratios and fundraising expenses relative to future realized
donations. For calculations, we assume α2 to be 15.3% and f2d∗2 = 3%, as identified as
average values by Lecy and Searing (2015). Therefore, p2 equals 0.817.
The future efficiency gain is described by g2 = 1+α2 · x2, depending on the future
administrative ratio α2 and future efficiency gain parameter x2. Using the same level
of α2 as in the calculation for p2 and assuming x2 = x1 results in g2 = 1.306, which
is used for further calculations.
The complete, abbreviated model can be seen in Model 1b.
Model 1b: Compound utility function (auxiliary variables)
subject to
α1 + f1d∗1
≤ 1 (1)
α1 ≥ 0 (2)
3 Numerical studies
After introducing the intuition of the model, in this section the model is analyzed in
detail. First, optimality and sensitivity analysis is conducted, which is followed by the
investigation of the implication of the information about overhead cost available to
donors.
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3.1 Optimality and sensitivity analysis
Since the second derivative of the objective function is found to be f ′′(U ) = −2 · a ·
x1 ·d∗1 , it becomes clear that the function is necessarily concave, as a, x1, d∗1 > 0, thus
any extreme point found will be a global maximum. The assumptions that donations
d∗1 are a positive amount and the efficiency gain factor x1 is positive is very reasonable,
as benefits of increased administrative expenditure on administrative efficiency can
be assumed. A positive value of a is a reasonable assumption, as it translates into at
least some interest by the NPO into optimizing current impact generation. However,
the case of a = 0 could occur. In this special case, the utility function is reduced to
the impact maximizing part in period 2 of d2 · b · (1 − (α1 + f1d∗1 ) ·w2 · p2 · g2). In such
a case, the optimal level of α∗1 would be equal to 0. As the utility function is designed
to include the utility of different stakeholders, this special case will not be dealt with
in the remainder of the paper.
The optimal level of administrative cost ratio α∗1 is given by Eq. 3:
α∗1 =
1
2
− 1
2 · x1 −
f1
2 · d∗1
− (1 − a) · b · d2 · p2 · g2 · w2
2 · a · d∗1 · x1
under the condition that constraints (1) and (2) are fulfilled (3)
The level of utility created at α∗1 , U∗, can be easily calculated using the equations
obtained:
U∗ = a · d
∗
1 − (a − 1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · w2)2
4 · a · d∗1 · x1
+ a · (d
∗
1 − f1)2 · x1
4 · d∗1
+ a · d
∗
1 · (d∗1 − f1) − 2 · (a − 1) · b · d∗1 · d2 · g2 · p2 + (a − 1) · b · d2 · (d∗1 + f1) · g2 · p2 · w2
2 · d∗1 (4)
Proposition 1 The optimal level of the administrative cost ratio α∗1 is bounded by
α∗1 < 0.5
Proposition 1 indicates, that the highest possible value for the optimal level of
administrative cost ratio α∗1 is 0.5, which can be derived from Eq. 3. This high value can
only be approximated if f1 = 0 and x1 takes a very large value. This can be explained
by the two countervailing effects inherent in the utility function, with negative and
positive influences of increased administrative spending in the first period (reduced
program ratio but increased efficiency) and negative impact in the second (increased
price of giving).
After deriving the optimal administrative cost level we explore the sensitivity of
these partial derivatives for the parameters to describe the changes in the optimal level
of α∗1 for changes in the parameters as can be seen in Table 2.
The weight of the utility function concerning the periods a has a positive effect
on the level of α∗1 , which is due to the fact that the weight a is the weight of the
current impact part, while 1 − a describes the weight of the future impact part. If
a increases, more of the utility created comes from the current period, increasing
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the importance of administrative efficiency. However, this effect is decreasing in a.
This result indicates that organizations that focus more strongly on future budget
and impact maximization than current impact tend to have a lower α∗1 than NPOs
focusing on current impact. Hence, a higher level of α∗1 might be an indication that
an organization is more focused on efficiently serving its beneficiaries right now than
focusing on sustaining their operations. Hence, contrary to current perception that a
high α∗1 always means that an organization uses the donations in an inefficient manner,
it can be an indicator of responsible resource use.
The opposite is true for b, with increasing values describing less discounting of
future donations, meaning that the NPO ascribes a higher value to future donation
inflows. This fosters the second periods’ utility part, favoring less administrative
expenses. w2 does the same, but from a price effect viewpoint. Increases in w2
account for higher deductions of utility from administrative expenses. If w2 increases,
decreases in α∗1 follow in response. This results in recovering donations in the future
period, with the decrease in α∗1 continuing until the resulting utility from the donation
surge in the future period cancels out the loss of utility from administrative efficiency
of the first period.
Analyzing the partial derivatives of α∗1 with respect to f1 shows the negative impact
of fundraising expenses on administrative expenses. The analysis of the impact of x1
reveals that the size of this effect is influenced both by the first period depending on
x1 and by the second period depending on b, w2 and p2, g2 and d2, the efficiency gain
parameter x1 has a strictly positive effect. Interestingly, the effect of x1 is decreasing
in x1 itself.
While the price of giving and the program ratio include both administrative expenses
as well as fundraising expenses in their effects, the efficiency gain considers only
administrative expenses. How do the levels of fundraising and administrative expenses
separately influence the resulting utility? In Fig. 2, the compound utility level is
depicted depending on the values of administrative costs α1 and fundraising expen-
diture as f1. Administrative cost levels α1 on the x-axis and the ratio of fundraising
expenses relative to total budget f1d∗1 on the y-axis result in varying levels of utility
created, depicted by increasing intense shades of grey. Since α1 + f1d∗1 ≤ 1, the upper
right triangle of the figure does not include any feasible solution, as this constraint is
violated there. It can be seen that increasing levels of f1d∗1 quickly decrease the optimal
level of α1 towards 0, which is depicted by the white line for every possible value off1
d∗1
. In an environment of low fundraising expenses of 3% of total donations, given the
choice of parameters in this paper, α∗1 = 13.34%, while for f1 = 10%, the ratio of
α∗1 decreases to 9.84%. Concluding, it can be said that NPOs cannot take decisions
concerning administrative capacities separately from future impact considerations, but
have to evaluate them jointly. Next we analyze how changes in parameters influence
the optimal utility level U∗.
The partial derivatives for the parameters with respect to the optimal level of utility
U∗ are summarized in Table 3, which can be found in the appendix. While the effect
of future impact maximization has been investigated thoroughly in the literature (e.g.
Steinberg (1986) regarding budget maximization), one very interesting question is the
impact of efficiency gains on the optimal utility U∗.
123
Funds allocation in NPOs: the role of administrative cost…
Fig. 2 Utility level U depending on fundraising expenses f1 and administrative cost ratio α1
Table 2 Parameter’s partial derivatives with regard to α∗1
P Partial derivative of α∗1 with respect to parameter P Implication
a
b·w2·d2·g2·p2
2·a2·d∗1 ·x1
+
b − (1−a)·w2·d2·g2·p22·a·d∗1 ·x1 −
d∗1
a· f1·x1−(a−1)·b·d2·g2·p2·w2
2·a·d2·x1 +
d2 − (1−a)·w2·b·g2·p22·a·d∗1 ·x1 −
f1 −12·d∗1 −
g2 − (1−a)·w2·d2·b·p22·a·d∗1 ·x1 −
p2 − (1−a)·w2·d2·g2·b2·a·d∗1 ·x1 −
w2 − (1−a)·b·d2·g2·p22·a·d∗1 ·x1 −
x1
a·d∗1 −(a−1)·b·d2·g2·p2·w2
2·a·d∗1 ·x21
+
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold x1 >
(
a·d∗1 −(a−1)·b·d2·g2·p2·w2
a·(d∗1 − f1)
)
(≡ t1) above
which the utility U∗ increases if the efficiency gain parameter x1 increases.
As Table 2 indicates, an increase in x leads to an increase in α∗1 . The increase in α∗1
leads to positive (efficiency gain) and negative (price effect and program ratio effects)
on the utility U∗. If x1 is below the threshold t1, then the later effects dominate, leading
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to a negative effect on utility. Above the threshold, the reverse holds, as Proposition 2
describes. This shows that for an NPO, efficiency gains are not necessarily beneficial.
Corollary 1 The threshold t1 of Proposition 2 is increased by the components of the
future budget part of the utility function. The weight 1 − a and the parameters b, d2,
w2, g2, p2 and f1 all reduce the threshold t1.
Corollary 1 presents the counter-intuitive finding, that the effect of the efficiency
gain of administrative costs (in the first period) on the optimal utility is determined
by the parameters of the second period. At a second glance, the importance of the
first period utility relative to the second period determines the increase in utility.
Therefore, increasing administrative capacities is more useful for an NPO focusing on
impact generation, than an NPO determined to increase future budget and impact.
Proposition 3 While the effect of the present donation parameter d∗1 on the optimal
level of administrative cost ratio α∗1 is positive, the second period donation parameter
d2 has a negative impact.
The different impact of the two periods’ donation parameters is stated by Proposition 3.
The current donations d∗1 increase the optimal level of α∗1 due to higher potential impact
generated in the current period, which can be facilitated through higher administrative
efficiency and, thus, higher administrative expense ratios. The future period contrasts
this effect since it aims at maximizing the future impact only, leading to lower admin-
istrative cost ratios to decrease the price effect on donations. In Fig. 3, the impact of
different levels of d∗1 and d2 on the optimal level of administrative cost ratio α∗1 can be
seen. On the x-axis, the future donation potential d2 is depicted, while on the y-axis
the realized donations d∗1 are represented. The resulting coloring describes the opti-
mal level of administrative spending α∗1 for the combinations of these two donation
parameters and helps to understand how α∗1 depends on the fluctuation of the donations
between periods. If the future base donations are very low, it can be the case that a
relatively high level of α∗1 is optimal. The opposite is true if the future base donations
are high compared to the realized donations d∗1 .
Corollary 2 The parameters b, w2, g2 and p2 increase the partial derivative of α∗1
with respect to d∗1 , and decrease the partial derivative of α∗1 with respect to d2. The
parameters x1 and d∗1 have the respective opposite effects.
An increase in d∗1 leads to an increase in the administrative cost ratio α∗1 , while an
increase in d2 leads to a decrease. The magnitude of both effects is increased by b,
w2, g2 and p2, and decreased by d∗1 and x1, for d2 also by a. NPOs that are indifferent
between current and future budget (i.e. a = 0.5) will increase (decrease) α∗1 in a
more severe manner as d∗1 (d∗2 ) increases. A similar trend is true for NPOs that face
a highly competitive donation ’market’ (i.e., NPOs with a high w2). This means, that
the importance of changing donation levels for administrative cost ratios is especially
relevant for organizations with a high discount factor, a high advertisement effect and
a high price effect.
It can be stated that the effects of fluctuating donations and willingness to donate
can even have detrimental effects on the administrative capacities. If future willingness
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Fig. 3 Optimal level of administrative cost ratio depending on donation levels d∗1 and d2
to donate is expected to increase, the level of administrative expenses could be reduced
from an NPO focused on sustaining operations by maximizing future impact. Contrary,
NPOs are advised by the proposed model to increase administrative ratios if lower
willingness to donate can be foreseen to make better use of the current budget.
3.2 Influence of information transparency
Not only the exact ratio of administrative costs has an impact on the willingness to
donate of private donors, but also the amount of information that donors have con-
cerning the use of funds by the NPOs. In the previously discussed Model 1b, fully
informed donors are investigated. There is a strong move towards increased avail-
ability of financial information. Various institutions, including ‘charity watchdogs’
like Guidestar or Charity Navigator, aim at increasing NPO financial transparency
by increasing accessibility of NPO tax data. This data comes from the US Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) and is well suited for the calculation of overhead cost ratios.
This transparency is considered as an important factor in the non-profit starvation
cycle (Lecy and Searing 2015). The important question is whether this strive for more
transparency is beneficial to the various stakeholders.
Thus, the parameter i2, introduced to measure this transparency as information
availability, is used. i2 can take any value between 0 and 1, with 0 describing a situa-
tion in which no information about the overhead ratios is available for donors, and 1
describing a situation, where every donor has all financial information available. Con-
sequently, lower values of i2 will raise the importance of the second periods’ impact
utility measure since the impact section is unaltered by this parameter.
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Model 2: Compound utility function including donor information parameter i2 (price
effect)
subject to
α1 + f1d∗1
≤ 1 (5)
α1 ≥ 0 (6)
The optimal level α∗1 and the respective utility U∗ are given by
α∗1 =
1
2
− 1
2 · x1 −
f1
2 · d∗1
− (1 − a) · b · i2 · w2 · d2 · g2 · p2
2 · a · d∗1 · x1
U∗ = a · d
∗
1 − (a − 1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · w2 · i2)2
4 · a · d∗1 · x1
+ a · (d
∗
1 − f1)2 · x1
4 · d∗1
+ a · d
∗
1 · (d∗1 − f1)−2 · (a−1) · b · d∗1 · d2 · g2 · p2+(a−1) · b · d2 · (d∗1 + f1) · g2 · p2 · w2 · i2
2 · d∗1 (7)
∂α∗1
∂i2
= − (1 − a) · b · w2 · d2 · g2 · p2
2 · a · d∗1 · x1
(8)
Proposition 4 Increasing the information available to private donors concerning
financial data decreases the optimal level of the administrative cost ratio α∗1 .
Corollary 3 While x1, d∗1 and a weaken this effect, b, w2, d2, g2 and p2 lead to an
increased reduction of α∗1 .
Proposition 4 describes the impact of changes in the available financial informa-
tion, lowering α∗1 , as shown in Eq. 7. While this effect is especially strong in NPOs
operating with high expected future base donations d2, the effects are also stronger if
b, the depreciation factor is higher, resulting in less depreciation. If the price of giving
effect w2 is high, the impact of information is also larger, while a higher efficiency
gain factor x1 can dampen this effect. Figure 4 exemplifies the complexity of this
relationship of fundraising, information and optimal administrative cost levels. On the
x-axis, the fundraising ratio relative to realized donations f1d∗1 is represented, while the
y-axis shows the level of information i2. The coloring depicts the level of optimal
administrative cost ratios α∗1 with darker shades denoting higher levels of α∗1 . As can
be seen, for low values of i2, a relatively larger value of α∗1 is optimal even if f1 takes a
relatively high value, which can be attributed to the lack of information about overhead
cost ratios. Contrarily, if i2 rises, this is especially detrimental for NPOs with high
levels of f1. Additionally, it has to be stated, that this effect occurs only for increased
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Fig. 4 Optimal level of administrative cost ratio depending on fundraising expenses f1 and information
parameter i2
financial information available and does not explore the effects of other performance
measurement information on donation behavior.
Another interesting relationship exists between the size of the efficiency gain param-
eter x1 and the level of information i2 available to the donors. For very low x1 < 1, α∗1
should always be 0 as α∗1 becomes negative, while with increases in x1 the increases in
the level of α∗1 occur fast but decrease in their speed, as can be seen in Fig. 5. On the x-
axis, the level of information i2 is depicted, while the efficiency gain parameter can be
seen on the y-axis. The darker shades describe higher levels of optimal administrative
cost ratios α∗1 . Figure 5 helps understanding the high importance of the efficiency gain
parameter x1 for the level of α∗1 . With increases in i2, α∗1 is reduced, which becomes
even more clear in Fig. 6. Here, different levels of utility are depicted depending on
the information i2 available to the donors on the y-axis and the administrative expense
level α1 on the x-axis, exhibiting that through increasing the level of information, the
level of α1 providing the highest possible utility is continuously shifted towards lower
levels of α1 as can be seen from the white line depicting the optimal levels of α∗1 for
each level of i2.
Effects on U∗ will be described in the following. The partial derivative for i with
respect to the utility function is given by:
(a−1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · ((a − 1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · w2 · i2−a · d∗1 +a · x1 · (d∗1 + f1))
2 · a · d∗1 · x1
(9)
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Fig. 5 Optimal level of administrative cost ratio depending on the efficiency gain parameter x1 and infor-
mation parameter i2
Fig. 6 Utility level U , depending on administrative expense ratio α1 and information parameter i2
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Corollary 4 Increases in the parameters f1, x1, and a all facilitate the negative impact
of i2, while b, d2, g2, p2 and w2 reduce the negative impact.
Concluding it can be stated that high transparency of financial data is especially
detrimental to NPOs with a high potential for efficiency gains through increased admin-
istrative spending x1. Of course, more knowledge about non-program usage of funds
is especially bad for NPOs facing a donation ’market’ with low donation elasticities
of price of giving, which is closely linked to w2 and also NPOs which value future
donations much less compared to current (b far less than 1).
4 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a quantitative model to analyze the impact of fund allo-
cations with the focus on administrative cost ratios. Based on the analytical models
studied, an optimal level of administrative cost ratio has been determined. This ratio
is bounded by 0.5.
The impact of different factors on the optimal level of administrative cost ratio has
been at the center of the research. The optimal level is always increasing in the effi-
ciency gain of increased administrative capacities, the associated utility created can
only increase if the efficiency gain is above threshold t1. Our results suggest that chal-
lenges posed by fluctuating donations can result in negative impact on administrative
capacities in case of increased future willingness to donate. Thus, if NPOs anticipate
a high future donation potential, their current impact receives less administrative sup-
port than optimal under a constant flow of donations. This highlights the importance
of a steady flow of donations not only from an operational perspective in general but
from the perspective of efficient administration of NPOs. This result is consistent with
information received in a personal interview with The World Food Program (WFP).
The WFP is struggling with highly fluctuating donations, which makes it difficult for
them to make a sustainable plan for building relief infrastructures.
Furthermore, our research shows that the focus on financial performance mea-
surements in NPOs, supported by increasingly available overhead cost information
to donors, can lead to detrimental effects on utility created through resulting reduced
administration cost ratios. This is especially true for NPOs facing high efficiency gains
in increased administrative expenditure in a donation ’market’ with low donation elas-
ticities of price of giving.
While the focus of this paper has been on the establishment of an analytic model for
issues related to overhead and especially administrative cost ratios of NPOs, the prop-
erties of the model lend themselves to useful extensions and new research questions.
Some foreseeable future research opportunities relate to the notion of competition in
NPO operations by establishing a multi-NPO, multi-period setting suited to model
the nonprofit starvation cycle. Another promising research direction is taking the
size of an NPO into account when determining the efficiency gains, as small NPOs
often require low administrative expenses, as much work can be done on a voluntary
basis. When NPOs grow, however, the administrative requirements tend to grow even
stronger (Lecy and Searing 2015). Further worthwhile research opportunities include
the quality of the performance measurement and its impact on this framework. Fur-
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thermore, as has been shown in Sect. 3.1, the close relationship in decision-making
between setting the expenses of fundraising f1 and subsequently determining the use
of the received donations (deciding on α1) should be investigated in an integrated
way, providing future research opportunities beyond the scope of this paper. Further
potential for research can be found in the efficiency gain function, which is linear in
this research but could take different functional forms, and in introducing uncertainty
for future base donations into account.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Setting f1 = 0 in Eq. 3 and using the assumptions of Table 1
(all variables non-negative and a > 0), lim
x1→∞
α∗1 = 0.5.
Proof of Proposition 2
∂U∗
∂x1
= −(a · d
∗
1 − (a−1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · w2)2+a2 · (d∗1 − f1)2 · x2)
4 · a · d∗1 · x21
is positive in case of
(a · d∗1 −(a−1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · w2)2<a2 · (d∗1 − f1)2 · x21 which can be reformulated:
x1 >
(
a · d∗1 − (a − 1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · w2
a · (d∗1 − f1)
)
Proof of Corollary 1 Partial derivatives for the threshold t1 of Proposition 2 with
respect to the parameters b, d2, w2, g2, p2 and f1 lead to the result that all these
parameters have a negative impact on the threshold t1.
Proof of Proposition 3 The partial derivatives of the optimal level of administrative
expenses with respect to the two donation parameters d∗1 and d2 can be investigated
under the assumptions stated in Table 1 requiring the parameters and variables to take
on positive values. As 1 − a > 0, all components of the first partial derivative are
positive, leading to a total positive impact of donations, while for the partial derivative
with respect to d2, the minus sign reverses this effect.
∂α∗1
∂d∗1
= a · f1 · x1 − (a − 1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · w2
2 · a · d∗21 · x1
∂α∗1
∂d2
= − (1 − a) · w2 · b · g2 · p2
2 · a · d∗1 · x1
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Proof of Corollary 2 Using the non-negativity assumptions of Table 1, the proof fol-
lows from
∂α∗1
∂d∗1
= a · f1 · x1 − (a − 1) · b · d2 · g2 · p2 · w2
2 · a · d∗21 · x1
∂α∗1
∂d2
= − (1 − a) · w2 · b · g2 · p2
2 · a · d∗1 · x1
Partial derivatives with respect to the mentioned parameters show the described impact
of the parameters.
Proof of Proposition 4 Using the non-negativity assumptions of Table 1, the proof
follows from
∂α∗1
∂i2
= − (1 − a) · b · w2 · d2 · g2 · p2
2 · a · d∗1 · x1
Proof of Corollary 3 Using the non-negativity assumptions of Table 1, the proof fol-
lows from
∂α∗1
∂i2
= − (1 − a) · b · w2 · d2 · g2 · p2
2 · a · d∗1 · x1
Partial derivatives with respect to the mentioned parameters show the described impact
of the parameters.
Proof of Corollary 4 Partial derivatives for the partial derivative of i2 with respect to
U∗ with respect to the parameters a, f1 and x1 lead to the result that all these parameters
facilitate the negative impact of i2 on U∗, while b, d2, g2, p2 and w2 decrease this
impact.
Utility at optimal administrative cost ratio level α∗1
See Table 3.
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